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Abstract
String dualities establish empirical equivalence between theories that often
look entirely different with respect to their basic ontology and physical struc-
ture. Therefore, they represent a particularly interesting example of empiri-
cal equivalence in physics. However, the status of duality relations in string
physics differs substantially from the traditional understanding of the role
played by empirical equivalence. The paper specifies three important differ-
ences and argues that they are related to a subsantially altered view on the
underdetermination of theory building.
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1. Introduction
The abundance of duality relations constitutes one of the most impor-
tant and conspicuous characteristics of string physics. Dual theories are
empirically equivalent to each other. They typically share one parameter
(like a coupling constant or the radius of a compact dimension) whose value
is inverted when switching from a theory to its dual. The same spectrum
of values for observables can be found in both theories, but those observ-
ables may be interpreted in very different ways in the theory and its dual.
Two kinds of string dualities, T-duality and S-duality, play a crucial role
in connecting the 5 consistent types of superstring theory, thereby turning
the spectrum of possible types of superstring theories into one unique co-
herent web of ’perspectives’ on the same theory. Another very important
exemplification of duality is the AdS/CFT correspondence first suggested in
Maldacena (1998). This correspondence reaches out beyond string theory
proper by relating a string theory on anti-de Sitter spacetime to a conformal
field theory on the boundary of that spacetime. Remarkably, this duality
relation implies the empirical equivalence of a theory that contains gravity
(the string theory) and a theory without gravity (the conformal field theory).
In recent years, a lot of work has been invested into attempts to generalize
AdS/CFT correspondence to other contexts and maybe eventually move to-
wards a general gauge-gravity duality in physics. One effect of ideas in that
direction was the emergence of a new understanding of the relation between
string theory and quantum field theory. Both are now increasingly perceived
as one overall of closely related concepts which may find a full understanding
only when viewed in conjunction.
By constituting the most conspicuous form in which empirical equiva-
lence between theoretical descriptions is found in high energy physics today,
duality relations arguably have led to a new view on the phenomenon of em-
pirical equivalence in physics. Identifying empirical equivalence in the form
of duality relations has turned into a crucial method for acquiring a deeper
and more complete understanding of a fundamental physical theory. The
present paper will look at the nature of the change of perspective that takes
place when empirical equivalence starts being understood primarily in terms
of duality relations. The analysis will rely on a specific historical interpreta-
tion of the view on empirical equivalence that was prevalent throughout most
of the 20th century (presented in general terms in Section 2). Section 3 will
relate that view to Henry Poincare´’s conventionalism. The comparison of
this ’traditional view’ with the picture that emerges in the context of string
dualities will demonstrate what is new about the duality based point of view
on empirical equivalence (Sections 4 and 5). The corresponding shift will
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then be argued to be exemplary of a general change of the perspective on
theory building that has emerged in connection with the evolution of string
theory.
2. Empirical Equivalence in Physics
The view on empirical equivalence that is characteristic of 20th century
physics has been shaped to a considerable degree by the 19th century rise
of abstract mathematics, which turned out far richer and more diverse than
anyone would have imagined a century earlier and led to a novel view of the
role of mathematics in the description of physical phenomena.
At the beginning of the 19th century, mathematics was understood to
provide a tool for representing and analyzing the quantitative aspects of ob-
servations in a way that relied on human intuitions about the world1. It was
further taken for granted that micro-physical objects adhered to those basic
intuitions as well. Neither the need nor the possibility was acknowledged that
mathematics or fundamental physics should or could lead beyond the basic
intuitions on which human perception of the everyday world relied. Those in-
tuitions grasped the physical world in terms of solid objects or continua that
were exactly located in 3 dimensional flat space and moved along a universal
time axis. Mathematics was the tool for representing and parameterizing the
dynamics of those objects. I shall call this view the classical intuitive view
of physics.
The notion of a ’classical intuitive view’ will be helpful in the following for
describing the role of abstract mathematics in 19th and 20th century physics.
The reasons for using this concept will only become fully clear in Section 4,
however, where it will play a crucial role in characterizing the specific status
of duality relations in string physics.
Needless to say, already pre-19th century concepts relied on abstractions.
Newtonian mechanics, or Aristotelian physics, for that matter, are abstract
conceptions which do involve what one may call unintuitive elements. The
notion of a ”classical intuitive view” is not based on a fictitious point zero of
abstraction. By stating the intuitions about physical objects at a given point
in time (roughly the early 19th century), it rather introduces a backdrop
against which the gradient towards the increasingly unintuitive conceptual-
izations of later periods can be defined.
The 19th century saw a fundamental shift in the understanding of math-
ematics. New mathematical conceptualizations like complex analysis and
1At a philosophical level, this understanding is for example represented by Kant’s view
on the synthetic a priori character of space and time.
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curved and higher dimensional spaces suggested that mathematics was not
merely a discipline that could represent human intuitions but was capable of
transcending them. The deployment of abstract mathematics made physics
reach out beyond the classical intuitive view. New mathematics allowed for
representations of observed data that did not rely on the classical intuitions
about the spatial structure and ontology of objects. Eventually, physical
theories such as special and general relativity or quantum mechanics were
developed that reached dramatically beyond the physical posits of classical
physics.2
The described shift from ’old’ to ’new’ physics had a substantial effect
on the understanding of what was physically possible. ’Old’ physics had
been based on the understanding that the intuition-based and seemingly
unquestionable basic understanding of what the objects of this world were
like strictly implied what was a physically possible phenomenon. On that
basis, to give one example, Newton could understand his development of
scientific theory as a ”deduction from the phenomena”: for Newton, the
data available at the time uniquely implied the true theoretical description
and, on its basis, the character of future observations.
Contrary to that view, the new understanding that emerged based on the
increasing richness of abstract mathematics and its growing role in physics
suggested that physics could come up with an adequate mathematical re-
construction whenever strange deviations from the the classical empirical
expectations showed up. Driving this point of view to its radical conclusion,
it became plausible to expect that any observational regularity pattern imag-
inable could be represented by some physical theory based on a sufficiently
inventive use of modern mathematics. By accounting for observation pat-
terns that had appeared paradoxical from a classical intuitive view, special
relativity and quantum mechanics both appeared as exemplifications of that
process. If physical conceptualization based on modern mathematics seemed
flexible enough to reproduce any sort of observational regularity, however,
there was no reason to assume that just one empirically adequate physical
conceptualization was possible. It seemed more natural to expect a system-
2Note that we are interested in what physicists took to be the physical characteristics of
the world. Increased mathematical abstraction such as the deployment of the Hamiltonian
or Lagrangian formalism in classical mechanics does not per se constitute a development
away from the classical intuitive view as long as the more absract formalism is taken to
deal with the same old physical objects. The boundaries between physical characteristics
of the world and mathematical formalism become increasingly blurred, however, with the
deployment of higher mathematics. Nothing in our analysis hinges on keeping up a strict
distinction between the two sides.
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atic underdetermination of physical theory building by empirical data. In
other words, it seemed plausible to expect that typically several or many
empirically equivalent theories could be constructed which all could accu-
rately describe a given observed phenomenon.3
At this point, it is important to make some clarificatory remarks on the
the relation between the underdetermination of theory building and empirical
equivalence. The main focus of this paper lies on the issue of full empirical
equivalence of scientific theories. Theories are empirically equivalent if they
have identical empirical implications. Underdetermination of theory building
in this strong sense means that not even all data that could be collected in
principle could fully determine theory building. One might also consider a
weaker form of underdetermination, however: underdetermination of theory
building under the available data. Underdetermination in this sense has been
called ”transient” underdetermination by Sklar (1975) and Stanford (2006)
and scientific underdetermination in Dawid (2006, 2013). Scientific under-
determination does not imply the existence of fully empirically equivalent
theories. It merely implies that there are theories between which one cannot
decide based on the available data.
Dawid (2006, 2013) makes the point that assessments of scientific un-
derdetermination play a crucial role in motivating trust in string theory in
the absence of empirical confirmation. The analysis of empirical equivalence
cannot, on its own, provide such reasons. This paper therefore has a different
focus. It analyses issues related to the evolution and conceptual understand-
ing of string physics, irrespectively of the question as to whether or not one
has good reasons for take the theory to be viable. Still, it is important to
point out that the two forms of underdetermination are related. The gen-
eral conceptual arguments for the existence of empirically equivalent theories
that have been stated at the beginning of this section speak also in favour
of scientific underdetermination: if the flexibility of theory building can be
expected to allow for constructing empirically fully equivalent theories, it
may be expected even more strongly that it allows for the construction of
theories that are empirically indistinguishable based on the available data.
Therefore, important characteristics of the view on empirical equivalence can
be nicely illustrated already at the level of scientific underdetermination. We
will make use of that similarity at one instance later in the text.
3This doesn’t mean that ’old’ physics knew no cases of empirically equivalent theory
building. One may just think of the Ptolemaic and the Copernican systems of planetary
motion. In the following, however, we shall be mostly interested in the connection be-
tween empirical equivalence and the unintuitive developments in modern physics based on
advanced mathematics.
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3. Poincare´’s Conventionalism
At the turn of the 20th century, one influential idea provided a conceptual
framework for the general considerations discussed in the previous section:
Henry Poincare´’s conventionalism (1952).
Poincare´’s point of departure was the discovery of non-Euclidean space
by Gauss, Bolyai and Lobachevsky. In the late 19th century many philoso-
phers took that discovery as a refutation of Kant’s claim that (Euclidean)
space was synthetic a priori. If more than one kind of space structure was
mathematically possible, the decision as to which of those spaces character-
ized our world seemed to be an empirical question that had to be answered a
posteriori by comparing the empirical predictions of physical theories based
on each of those space structures with observation. Poincare´ agreed with
the verdict that the discovery of non-Euclidian geometries established that
space was not synthetic a priori.4 He denied, however, that this turned the
choice of physical space into an empirical question. Poincare´ argued that the
choice between possible geometries rather amounted to an aspect of theory
building that was in principle underdetermined by observation. Each choice
of geometry could lead to the same empirical predictions if the physical laws
of objects moving and interacting on that space were modified accordingly.
In other words, Poincare´ believed that the increased range of mathematical
conceptualization in the given case did not open up the possibility of rep-
resenting observational patterns that had no possible scientific description
before. Rather, he argued, the new degreees of freedom were fully spent on
widening the spectrum of empirically equivalent theories.
The resulting position is called conventionalism. It asserts that, once one
fully exploits the freedom of mathematical conceptualization in physical the-
ory building, physical theories become partly conventional. Some elements
of those theories can be chosen freely and, once specified, provide a frame-
work for adapting physical concepts to empirical data. The various possible
frameworks may not all be equally convenient but all of them provide a basis
for constructing an empirically adequate theory. Though Poincare´’s claim
of conventionalism was most famously applied to the question of space, he
suggested that conventionalism was a more general characteristic of physical
theory building.
The general view on empirical equivalence that emanates from Poincare´’s
4Poincare´ did not fully reject Kant’s claim of a synthetic a priori character of mathe-
matics. He did take arithmetic to be synthetic a priori and he tried to identify a synthetic
a priori feature on which our concept of space rested, which he called continuity. For a
discussion of this point, see e.g. Folina (2006).
6
conventionalism - I will call it the traditional view on empirical equivalence
- closely follows what has been said in general terms at the beginning of
this section. Empirically equivalent theories arise due to the high degree of
flexibility of physical theory building based on advanced mathematics. There
are more degrees of freedom in theory building than there are empirical
degrees of freedom the theories have to cover. The excess of theoretical
freedom can be exhausted by conventional choices that, in turn, amount to
the construction of empirically equivalent theories.5
This general view on the idea of empirical equivalence was prevalent in
physics throughout most of the 20th century. However, the record of discov-
ering actual physically interesting examples of empirically equivalent theories
was modest at best. Poincare´’s prime case of the geometry of physical space
became far more tricky after the advent of Einstein’s theory of general rel-
ativity, which has been understood by many - including Einstein himself -
as a refutation of Poincare´’s conventionalist understanding. (For a recent
philosophical discussion of that issue, see for example DiSalle (2002).)
Another context where the question of empirical equivalence arose was
the case of interpretations of quantum mechanics. However, influential in-
terpretations such as Everettian quantum mechanics or spontaneous collapse
models are not fully empirically equivalent to canonical quantum mechanics
(Barrett and Byrne 2012, Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber 1986). Even in the
case of Bohmian quantum mechanics, the question whether or not it is em-
pirically equivalent to canonical quantum mechanics is a matter of debate
(Valentini 1991).6
Other examples of empirical equivalence like the one between a canonical
formulation of QM in terms of the wave function and a description based
on the Feynman path integral formalism, rather than dealing with genuinely
different theories, appear as cases of different methods of formulating the
same theory.
Remembering the profound conceptual considerations that made the ex-
istence of empirically equivalent theories appear as a natural characteristic
5This paper merely aims at giving a general philosophical reconstruction of the relation
between the traditional view on empirical equivalence and Poincare´’s conventionalism. It
does not aim at doing justice to the nuanced debates on the issue during Poincare´’s lifetime
and beyond. For discussions of this subject, see Friedman (1996), Zahar (1997) and Ben
Menahem (2001, 2012). Other recent discussions of conventionalism are Psillos (2014),
and Ivanova (2015).
6Interpretations of quantum mechanics that are not fully empirically equivalent to
each other do exemplify scientific underdetermination: they are indistinguishable under
the available data.
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of modern physics from a conventionalist point of view, actual physics until
the 1990s had thus produced surprisingly little in terms of actual empirically
equivalent theories.
The discovery of a wide spectrum of empirically equivalent theories based
on duality relations thus, at first glance, could be read as a late fulfilment of
the philosophical considerations of Poincare´ and others a century ago. Closer
examination reveals a rather different story, however.
4. Empirical Equivalence and Duality
Theories with and without gravitons seem empirically profoundly differ-
ent alternatives. Nevertheless, at least in the case of conformal theories and
gravity on AdS space, AdS/CFT duality conjectures that the entire range of
observable phenomena that can be accounted for by one of those theories can
also be covered by the other. Graviton theories thus can look like theories
without gravity - and theories without gravitons can look like gravitational
theories. Fundamental gravitons in this light may be taken to play the role
played by curvature in Poincare´’s case. They constitute a conceptual ele-
ment that seems to lead to characteristic empirical signatures. But after
close inspection it turns out that those effects can be generated also without
including this element in the fundamental theory. A well chosen pure gauge
field theory does the job as well. Thus we have two ways of reproducing
the same empirical data. There is too much conceptual flexibility in theory
building.
On that view, it seems plausible to understand AdS/CFT as an instan-
tiation of empirical equivalence as traditionally understood. Similar lines of
reasoning can be found for S- and T- daulity as well. However, closer in-
spection of the issue reveals three important differences between the case of
string dualities and classical exemplifications of the traditional take on em-
pirical equivalence. Those differences shall be discussed the upcoming three
subsections.
4.1. The process of establishing empirical equivalence
First, we shall consider the emergence of an understanding of empirical
equivalence in the two cases.
From a conventionalist point of view, the existence of empirically equiva-
lent theories can be established by new mathematics or new physical mech-
anisms which enhance the flexibility of fitting theory to data. Once one has
understood how the new conceptual tools can be used for theory building
and how, on that basis, theories can be tailored to fit empirical data, one
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can reproduce the same data based on various conceptual frameworks. This
establishes the empirical equivalence of the corresponding theories.
For example, non-Euclidean geometry introduces a new framework for
describing observations of moving objects in space. Once one understands
how force laws and background geometry work together for reproducing ob-
servations, one can reproduce our observations based on a wide spectrum of
background geometries by selecting the force laws accordingly. This results
in a spectrum of empirically equivalent theories based on a wide range of
background geometries.
It is instructive to point out that the general spirit behind that kind
of reasoning is by no means confined to a turn of the 20th century view
on physics. A nice though ’imperfect’ example of this view on empirical
equivalence is the analysis of large extra dimensions in contemporary gauge
field theory.
High energy physics provides at least two conspicuous energy scales that
lie far beyond the energy levels of the standard model of particle physics.
First, the three gauge couplings of the standard model show an energy de-
pendence that makes them meet roughly at one energy scale7. This scale,
which is about 1012 times as high as the characteristic scale of the standard
model, is called the grand unified scale and provides the basis for introducing
fully unified gauge theories at that scale. Second, the gravitational constant,
which is many orders of magnitude smaller than the gauge couplings at the
standard model scale, grows quadratically with energy and thus assumes val-
ues comparable to those of the gauge coupling(s) at the so called Planck scale,
which lies about 100 times above the grand unified scale. For a long time,
physicists took for granted that the described scale differences denoted actual
differences between characteristic energy scales of various types of interaction
in 3+1 dimensional spacetime. In the late 1990s it was then suggested that
all available empirical data could be reproduced based on the assumption of
a higher dimensional spacetime where the extra dimensions were either com-
pactified (Arkani-Hamed, Dimopoulos and Dvali 1998) or showed a particular
(warped) geometry (Randall and Sundrum 1999). In those models, some ex-
tra dimensions were transgressed by all interactions while others could be
transgressed only by gravitation. The altered power laws for interaction at
distance in higher dimensional space then implied that both the actual grand
unified scale and the actual Planck scale could lie close to observable energy
scales. ’Large extra dimension models’ play an important role in high energy
physics theory building today and we will also encouter them later on in the
7the meeting of the gauge coupling works much better in a supersymmetric framework.
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context of string thery.
Large extra dimension models are not fully empirically equivalent to four-
dimensional theories. Once one can test the energy scale of the extra dimen-
sions, they produce characteristic signatures that distinguish them from four-
dimensional models. They are empirically equivalent to four-dimensional
models at energy scales tested up to this point, however. And within that
limited framework, what is going on agrees well with the traditional under-
standing of empirical equivalence. Once we move beyond our intuition-based
prejudice (in this case the prejudice that spacetime is 3+1 dimensional), new
conceptual options open up which provide the basis for new theories that
reproduce the same empirical data.
Let us compare this situation with the way dualities typically emerge in
string theory. We first look at AdS/CFT duality (Maldacena 1998, Gubser,
Klebanov and Polyakov 1998, Witten 1998). The duality relates a string
theory on 5 dimensional anti-de Sitter space plus 5 compact dimensions to
an N = 4 super-conformal theory in 4 dimensions. The latter is a pure gauge
field theory with 4 supercharges. This highly symmetric structure enforces a
conformal symmetry. Apart from Poincare´ invariance, conformal symmetry
roughly speaking enforces invariance under transformations that preserve
angles but do not preserve lengths. In particular, this means that the theory
is scale invariant.
Both theories that are connected by the duality have their conceptual
roots in the 1960s and had been developed by the 1980s. String theory
began its career as a theory of strong interactions under the name ’dual reso-
nance model’ in the late 1960s and was proposed by Scherk and Schwarz as a
theory of all interactions in (1974). The first anomaly-free superstring theory
found by Green and Schwarz in (1984) established the theory as a promising
way to go. It was understood already in the early days of string theory that
the physics on the the 1+1 dimensional string world sheet (the area swept
out by a string moving through space) could be described by a 2-dimensional
conformal field theory. After the formulation of space-time supersymmetry
in 1974 and the following investigations into extended supersymmetries (the-
ories with more than 1 supercharge), it was shown in (Mandelstam 1983)
that N=4 supersymmetry (a theory with 4 supercharges) in 4 dimensions
was a conformal field theory.
AdS/CFT thus did not reveal the existence of any new theory. The
theories related to each other by the duality were long known when the
duality was formulated. What the duality did reveal was the fact that for
each set of parameter values on one side one could choose the parameter
values on the other side in way so that the theories on both sides were
empirically equivalent.
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There is a reason why the duality was not formulated in the 1970s or
1980s: Conceptual elements of string theory that were important for seeing
the duality were only understood in the 1990s. Those elements played an
essential role in motivating the duality conjecture.
To understand this point, we briefly want to rehearse the basic line of
reasoning leading up to Maldacena’s AdS/CFT duality conjecture in 1998.
(See Polchinski’s article in this volume.)
Maldacena’s derivation of the duality relies on the concept of D3-branes,
3-dimensional objects on which open strings can end. The idea of higher
dimensional branes in string physics dates back to the 1980s but a full un-
derstanding of D-branes as an essential part of string theory was first achieved
by Polchinski in (1995). Another important ingredient in Maldacena’s rea-
soning are black p-branes, extended versions of black holes which arise in a
string theoretical context. Those objects were first described by Horowitz
and Strominger in (1991). Its connection to D-branes was pointed out by
Polchinski in 1995.
Maldacena considers the physics on a stack of coinciding D3-branes, which
can be described by a N=4 Super Yang Mills theory, the conformal field
theory referred to above.
The effective coupling of this super Yang-Mills theory at energy scale E
is
g2eff (E) = g
2
YMNE
p−3 (1)
Since the gauge fields are massless modes of open strings, we can write
the Yang Mills coupling in terms of the string coupling gs, which, In the
special case p = 3, leads to
g2eff = 4pigsN (2)
The effective Yang Mills theory will be a good approximation in the per-
turbative regime, that is if
4pigsN << 1 (3)
Seen from ”the outside”, that is from space beyond the p-dimensional sub-
space where the Yang Mills theory lives, the stack of coincident Dp-branes
constitutes a energetic object that curves spacetime around it. A stack of
Dp-branes of sufficient energy density constitutes a black brane, the gener-
alization of a black hole. More specifically, it constitutes an extremal black
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brane where the charge is maximal given its mass (which corrsponds to a
situation where all supersymmetries are unbroken). In the 3-brane case, an
event horizon of radius R is created in 5 dimensions of the 6-dimensional
space that is orthogonal to the extended dimensions of the brane. The 6th
dimension of that orthogonal space is the radial direction that parametrizes
the distance from the brane. R is
R/ls = g
−2
eff (4)
where ls denotes the string length, which means that R/ls is the radius
of the event horizon in units of the string length. Space around the black
brane forms a peculiar throat geometry where, traveling along the radial
dimension towards the brane, the spatial structure of the orthogonal space
converges towards a 5 dimensional compactified sphere around the brane with
the horizon radius R. (One thus can never reach the brane, unlike in the case
of a black hole.) Near the event horizon, the metric of the 3+1 dimensions
parallel to the brane assumes the form
ds2 = R2
ηµνdx
µdxν + dz2
z2
, (5)
which is the metric of anti-de Sitter space (AdS) with radius R (in
Poincare coordinates). The full 10 dimensional metric close to the horizon
thus has the form
ds2 = R2
ηµνdx
µdxν + dz2
z2
+R2dΩ25, (6)
which is AdS(5)xS5, a 5 dimensional anti de Sitter space with 5 extra
dimensions compactified on a 5-sphere. The AdS structure is a good ap-
proximation if the radius R is large compared to the string length ls so that
intractable stringy effects from the 5 compact dimensions are suppressed.
According to Equations (2) and (4), this is the case if
4pigsN >> 1 (7)
We thus have found two descriptions of a stack of N coincident D3-branes
which are valid in different limits. The 4-dimensional conformal gauge field
theory is valid in the small gsN limit while a supergravity description on
5-dimensional AdS space is valid in the limit of large gsN .
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Maldacena conjectured that the two theories describing the limits of the
D3-brane/black p-brane system are dual to each other. He did so by pointing
out that a wide range of characteristic properties of the theories match: the
number of physical degrees of freedom, the symmetry structure, the spectra
of states.
We see that Maldacena makes extensive use of the concept of D-branes
and its connection to black branes in order to motivate his conjecture of
AdS/CFT duality. He thus relies on conceptual tools that had been devel-
oped in the years immediately prior to his work.
The case of S and T-dualities shows a similar picture.
T-duality relates a string theory with a given radius R of a compacti-
fied dimension to a different string theory with radius 1/R (in units of the
string length ls). Closed strings moving along the compact dimension are
characterized by two discrete numbers: the quantized momentum along the
compact dimension (called the Kaluza Klein state) and the times the string
is wrapped around the compact dimension (called the winding number). The
Kaluza Klein state of the initial theory is equal to the winding number of the
T-dual and vice versa. Open strings which move freely through space in the
initial theory have no winding number. Therefore, T-duality enforces mo-
mentum zero along the compact dimension. This corresponds to the string
moving along a hyperplane in the compact dimension that corresponds to a
D-brane. By showing that D-branes behave consistently like genuine phys-
ical objects, Polchinski established them as a necessary ingredient of string
theory.
S-duality relates a string theory with string coupling gs to a string theory
with coupling 1/gs. First discussions of T- and S-duality date back to the
1980s. Only in the mid 1990s, however, a deeper understanding of the role
of dualities revealed that S- and T-dualities in conjunction could connect
all known types of string theory (Hull and Townsend 1995, Townsend 1995,
Witten 1995, Horava and Witten 1996, Polchinski and Witten 1996).
Soon after the first consistent formulation of a superstring theory by
Green and Schwarz, it was understood that one could only build 5 types of
superstring theory, which differed from each other in the string boundary
conditions, the internal symmetry group, the number of supersymmetries
and other properties. The understanding of S- and T-duality that emerged
in 1995 implied that all those types of superstring theory were just different
empirically equivalent formulations of the same theory.
Unlike in the case of AdS/CFT, the conceptual shifts of the second string
revolution in 1995 did lead to the conjecture of a new empirically equivalent
(formulation of the) theory. That theory is 11 dimensional M-theory, which
still remains very little understood. The core impact of T- and S-duality
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proper, however, is to reveal the coherent web of duality relations between
the five types of theories that had already been known since 1985.
Structurally, the difference between the mindset behind a traditional un-
derstanding of empirical equivalence and the mindset behind duality relations
thus may be formulated the following way. In both cases, the basic elements
that enter the argument are the same. We have
1. a new conceptual tool that allows for kinds of analysis that were not
possible before. In our examples, those tools would be:
non-Euclidean geometry in Poincare’s gravity example.
extra spatial dimensions in theories of large extra dimensions.
brane physics and related concepts in string dualities.
2. the empirical equivalence claims that are made after the new conceptual
tools have been deployed.
But the way those elements are connected is different. In the traditional
understanding, the use of the new conceptual tools actually leads to the
construction of new theories, which are then understood to be empirically
equivalent to theories that had been known before or, if a spectrum of new
theories had been developed, empirically equivalent to each other8. In the
duality cases, the theories were mostly known already from the start. The
new tools were mainly deployed for understanding the empirical equivalence
of known theories.
One might take this to be a historical contingency that in itself tells
little about the character of the involved theories. We should also keep in
mind that there is one very important case where a duality relation in string
physics indeed hints towards a new previously unknown theory: M-theory.
Still, there are conceptual reasons why physicists so often first find the dual
theories and only later, based on an additional conceptual step forward,
understand that the theories are empirically equivalent. Those reasons do
relate to the conceptual situation of string theory and shall be discussed in
the next subsection.
4.2. The role of the classical (intuitive) limit
The analysis will once again rely on the notion of the classical intuitive
view introduced in Section 1. Obviously, string theory is quite remote from
the classical intuitive view attributed to early physics. Strings and higher
dimensional Calabi Yau spaces clearly played no role in that intuitive world
8An example of this kind is the understanding that Schroedinger’s wave mechanics and
Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics were empirically equivalent.
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view. However, two significant ways can be identified in which it is possible
in a string theoretical context to move closer to the classical intuitive view.
First, one can look at string theory in the weakly coupled regime and second,
one can disregard higher dimensional objects, the so called branes.
Let us first look at the weak coupling limit. Point of departure for doing
string theory is to place a string in background space and calculate its dy-
namics. This is a perturbative approach, perturbing around a background
spacetime the curvature of which would be determined entirely by the string
dynamics in the full string theory. Perturbative calculations only work, how-
ever, if the string coupling is small, so that perturbation theory gives reliable
results based on a few orders in the perturbative expansion. Therefore, it is
necessary to look at the theory close to a weakly coupled limit.
The weak coupling limit, however, corresponds to the classical limit of the
theory. In string theory just like in gauge field theory, an expansion in g also
amounts to an expansion in h since g and h always appear to the same order in
the terms of perturbative calculations. Sticking to the weakly coupled regime
that is calculable based on perturbation theory thus corresponds to sticking
to a near-classical regime where quantum fluctuations don’t dominate. In
other words, looking only at perturbative string theory amounts to looking
at the regime of the theory where classical intuitions still work to certain
degree.
The second step towards the classical intuitive view consists in disre-
garding higher-dimensional branes. We have encountered D-branes already
in Section 4.1. in the context of T-duality.9 A Dp-brane is an infinetely ex-
tended object with p spatial dimensions on which open strings can end. Open
strings are tied to D-branes while closed strings can move freely away from
them. Matter and gauge particles are oscillation modes of open strings, while
the graviton is an oscillation mode of a closed string. Therefore, the exis-
tence of D-branes (of a dimension different than the dimension of background
space) implies that gravitation ”feels” a different number of dimensions than
the gauge interactions. The classical intuitive view does not know of any
dimensions that are not open to all interactions. Opening up this additional
degree of freedom thus constitutes a step away from the intuitive view. Dis-
regarding D-branes in turn leads a little closer to the classical intuitive view.
String theory up to the mid 1990s was confined to perturbative string
theory since no good method was known to reach out beyond it. And it was
- with a few exceptions (see e.g. Bergshoeff, Sezgin and Townsend 1987) -
disregarding brane physics since the latter seemed overly excentric.
9There are also other kinds of branes but they won’t concern us.
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Looking at the theory close to its classical limit and disregarding brane
physics makes it impossible to see the duality relations between the various
types of string theory, however.
Dual theories in string theory look decidedly different from each other
because their classical limits are different physical theories.10 This is most
conspicuous in the case of S-duality. (see Polchinski, Section 1 in this volume
for a more careful development on this argument.) S-duality relates a strongly
coupled theory to another theory that is weakly coupled. An analysis that
is confined to the weakly coupled /near-classical regime cannot reveal the
duality relation since the duality relates one theory in the weakly coupled
regime to a strongly coupled dual theory where our intuitions about the
dynamics of the theory’s ”fundamental” objects don’t apply. In other words,
our near-classical intuition prevents us from having an intuitive grasp of the
empirical equivalence between two S-dual theories.
T-duality connects a theory with a large radius R of a compact dimension
to a theory with a small radius. Due to the quantum nature of objects,
they cannot be localized in a small compact dimension. The near-classical
intuitive picture of localized objects therefore only works in the case of a
large compact dimensions R. For that reason, T-duality cannot be grasped
based on near-classical intuition. Moreover, T-duality only works due to
brane physics. Even if one assumed a superstring theory of a given type that
did not contain any D-brane, T-duality would relate that theory to a string
theory of a different type that did contain a D-brane. Without D-branes
T-duality does not get off the ground.
In the case of AdS/CFT correspondence, only a space with small cur-
vature can be viewed as a background space for propagating near-classical
particles. AdS-CFT correspondence relates AdS-space with a small curva-
ture to a strongly coupled field theory, however, that is once again not in a
near-classical regime. And once again, AdS/CFT correspondence rely on the
introduction of D-branes.
The role of (getting closer to) the classical intuitive view thus is very
10The classical limit of a quantum theory is a non-trivial issue already in non-relativistic
quantum mechanics (see Wallace 2013, Ballentine 1970). The issue whether the classical
limit of quantum mechnics is classical mechanics or statistical mechanics is comparable to
the case of of different classical limits of string theory in so far as different classical theories
can be reached by taking classical limits of the same quantum theory. It is substantially
less far-reaching however, because the different classical theories, unlike in the string case,
are taken to represent the same actual physical state (since statistical mechanics models
the observer’s limited knowledge of the system rather than the state’s irreducible statistical
properties).
16
AA B
”intuitive view”
beyond the ”i.v.” =
Figure 1: A canonical case of empirical equivalence
A
A
B
B
”intuitive view”
beyond the ”i.v.” =
Figure 2: A typical duality case.
different in the case of string dualities than in traditional cases of empir-
ical equivalence. In traditional cases, the detachment of theory building
from human intuitions creates new degrees of freedom for theory building.
These new degrees of freedom then provide the basis for having more dif-
ferent theories than different possible empirical patterns. This leads to the
phenomenon of empirical equivalence. Viewed from the opposite direction,
empirically equivalent theories are lost if one removes new conceptual tools.
Once non-Euclidean geometries are withdrawn, we are left with one theory
in Euclidean space. Once the concept of extra dimensions is withdrawn, we
are left with our canonical understanding of the running of gauge couplings
in a 3+1 dimensions background space. The structure of the relation be-
tween going beyond the intuitive view and finding empirical equivalence in
the traditional case is shown in Figure 1.
In the case of duality, the dual theories mostly have different classical
limits. Therefore, considering the classical limits does not make one of the
dual theories vanish. It just prevents the understanding of the duality re-
lation. Likewise, it is possible to formulate the theory in the perturbative
regime without introducing D-branes. But not accounting for them blocks
an understanding of the theory away from that limit. Only once one moves
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away from the regime where our (classical) physical intuition is applicable,
and once one takes brane physics into account, the different classical stories
merge into one full (quantum) story. The relation between an intuitive point
of departure and a non-intuitive analysis thus works the opposite way than
in the traditional cases. We have more empirically distinguishable theories
in the intuitive (classical) limit than there are empirically distinguishable
quantum theories. The structure of the transition from viewing the situation
close to the classical limit, which corresponds to the ”intuitive view” in the
given case, to viewing it after taking into account the full range of unintuitive
aspects of the theory is shown in Figure 2.
4.3. Understanding physics based on empirical equivalence
The third and arguably conceptually most interesting difference between
string dualities and conventional exemplifications of empirical equivalence
pertains to the role dualities play in understanding the theory at hand. In
the traditional picture, physicists don’t need the empirically equivalent the-
ory for attaining a full description of the initial theory. Physicists may get
a firmer grip on some physical aspects by approaching them from another
conceptual point of view, but only one theory on a subject is needed to fully
characterize the physics. For example, non-Euclidean geometry is not needed
to fully develop Euclidean physics. Nor are large extra dimensions, qua being
an alternative to conventional 4-dimensional theories of grand unification, a
means of understanding or completing the latter.
In the case of string dualities, the situation is very different. A good
understanding of the entire spectrum of theories is essential for understanding
the physical situation. Rather than talking about different theories, it seems
more accurate to talk about different dual perspectives on one theory.11 The
fact that none of the available perspectives is sufficient for fully understanding
the theory is rooted in the specific status of the perturbative approach to
string theory. As discussed above, perturbative calculations work well close to
a classical limit of the theory, in a weak coupling regime. Perturbation theory
cannot offer a basis, however, for extracting the dynamics of string theory
from the theory’s first principles. Since the string coupling itself corresponds
to the ground state of an oscillation mode of the string (the dilaton), the
specification of a specific (e.g. small) value of the string coupling must itself
be based on calculating the theory’s dynamics. Therefore, no full calculation
11Note that the term ”perspective” also indicates a difference to an interpretation of
the theory. While one may discuss whether one or the other interpretation is correct,
different perspectives may be more or less instructive with respect to a given question but
one perspective is not more or less correct or true than any other.
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of the string coupling can work on a perturbative basis. A full understanding
of string theory requires strategies for reaching out beyond the perturbative
regime.
Unlike in the case of gauge field theory, however, no full formulation of
the equations of motion, no full Lagrangian of string theory, has been found.
(One may add that even finding a full formulation of string theory would
not mean that the theory’s dynamics could be calculated on that basis.)
String theorists are therefore confined to making limited inroads into the
non-perturbative regime. The most successful strategy to that end has been
the use of duality relations. By relating a strongly coupled to a weakly cou-
pled theory, dualities offer possibilities for acquiring information about the
strongly coupled regime of a theory that cannot be directly accessed by per-
turbative methods. Dualities thus play an important role in understanding
string theory by extending the knowledge beyond the modest scope of what
can be known based on the perturbative analysis of the individual types of
string theory.
The five types of superstring theory that are related to each other and to
M-theory by duality relations are specified by characterizing the properties
of individual strings propagating on a background space.12 That is, they
are specified within a perturbative framework. Given that the perturbative
approach does not allow for a full understanding of the theory, however, the
question may be asked: in what sense do the perturbative formulations of
different types of string theory represent full-fledged theories at all that can
be claimed to be empirically equivalent to each other?
The fact that string theorists feel justifed to make the latter claim is based
on the understanding that a perturbative description of string theory, while
insufficient for fully understanding the theory, is sufficient for fully specifying
it. Specifying a string theory at the perturbative level is taken to determine
the characteristics of the full theory: the step from the perturbative level to
a full formulation of the theory would not require making any new physical
choices or introducing any new physical posits at the fundamental level.13
One may cite two general considerations that back this understanding.
First, the framework of gauge field theory, which is related to string theory
in a number of ways, provides a context where the connection between the
full theory and the perturbative regime is better understood and where the
12For a systematic construction of the five types of string theory, see e.g. Polchinski
1999.
13The situation is very different with respect to the theory’s groundstates. It is assumed
that a huge number of allowed groundstates exist. Selecting the actual groundstate, is a
stochastic quantum process.
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perturbative formulation of the theory, while insenitive to a number of non-
perturbative effects, stands in a nearly (though not always entirely) unique
relation to the full gauge field theory. Second, the strong evidence for duality
relations is argued to be difficult to interpret without taking them to be exact
(see e.g. Polchinski 2014). Taking duality relations to be exact, however,
implies assuming that an exact correspondence relation between dual theories
can be established already by specifying the theories within a perturbative
framework.
This characteristic of string physics is crucial for allowing statements of
empirical equivalence between different types of string theory at all. Only
if the individual types of string theory can be specified based on their char-
acterization within a perturbative framework is it possible to develop mean-
ingful claims of duality relations between them. Those duality claims, in
turn, strengthen the understanding of the various types of string theory and
thereby further contribute to the understanding that they can be specified
already at the perturbative level.
The specific role of string dualities with respect to understanding the
theory thus is closely related to the peculiar status of the perturbative level
of analysis of string theory. On the one hand, the perturbative analysis seems
sufficient for uniquely specifying the theory. On the other hand, however, it
is too weak for fully understanding and calculating the theory. On this basis,
duality relations can be formulated in a meaning full way and, at the same
time, can be of substantial use for learning more about string theory.
5. Conclusion
The three substantial differences between the traditional view on empiri-
cal equivalence and the case of string dualities which I have described in the
previous section play out at two levels.
In part, they constitute changes of the role empirical equivalence plays
in the scientific process. While in the traditional context cases of empirical
equivalence were established by applying new tools to theory building that
allowed a wider range of conceptual freedom, in the case of string dualities
they are mostly established by using new conceptual tools for establishing the
empirical equivalence of theories that were previously taken to empirically
distinguishable; and while the existence of empirically equivalent theories
previously posed the question which theory should be picked in order to
have the most effective (and maybe ontologically convincing) description of
the corresponding physics, in the case of string dualities taking all empirically
equivalent theories into account is essential for acquiring an understanding
of the full theory at all.
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But those pragmatic differences are based on substantial differences with
respect to the way the empirically equivalent theories are related to a classical
or in some sense more intuitive limit. In the canonical cases, moving to
that limit took away degrees of freedom that were necessary for opening
up the spectrum of empirically equivalent theories. In the case of string
dualities, the different empirically equivalent theories correspond to different
classical limits. In the canonical cases, each of the empirically equivalent
theories could be fully formulated. In the case of string physics, the dual
theories can be established to be empirically equivalent because they can
be specified already at the perturbative level. But that level of description
does not allow for a full formulation of the theory. In this light, it seems
more adequate not to talk about dual theories but about dual perspectives
on one theory that needs all those perspectives (and probably more) to be
fully characterized. Empirical equivalence thus turns from the phenomenon
of multiplicity in theory space to the phenomenon of different perspectives
on one theory, which are based on different conceptual starting points that
correspond to different classical limits of the theory.
While empirical equivalence seemed to be about the flexibility of concep-
tualizing observational regularities, in a string theory context it is about the
multiplicity of classical limits.
This shift corresponds to a substantial shift with respect to the role of
underdetermination of theory building. As discussed in Section 2, the tra-
ditional view on empirical equivalence seemed plausible in the face of the
increased power and flexibility of physical conceptualization in the late 19th
and earlier 20th century. In the face of this increasing strength of concep-
tual tools that increasingly freed physics from the constraints of intuitions
based on everyday observations, it seemed natural to assume that empirically
equivalent theories should arise. The further development in physics did not
really vindicate those expectations, however. Really convincing examples of
empirically equivalent theories were scarce, to say the least. The flexibility
of conceptual tools turned out to be compensated by the strong constraints
on consistent theory building that emerged throughout the 20th century.
In the context of string theory, the traditional picture becomes fully in-
adequate. However, a new view on empirical equivalence emerges, where
empirical equivalence is understood in terms of the spectrum of classical
limits of the full theory. From this point of view, talking about different
theories only makes sense once one has introduced elementary objects that
can be isolated close to one of the classical limits. What empirical equiva-
lence in the form of duality relations reveals is the fact that the options for
building different theories are scarcer than one would imagine when looking
at the classical limits of theories. Empirical equivalence thus no more is an
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indicator of the flexibility of theory building but, quite to the contrary, an
indicator of the strong constraints on theory building that is not fully visible
in the classical limit.
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